State Crimes and Autocracy

Crimes of the State | Week 6, Lecture 11

Professor Julian E. Gerez

May 4, 2026

Roadmap: State crimes and autocracy

  • Last time: publicized state violence as a research topic
    • Questions?
  • Today:
    • Do autocracies commit more state crimes?
    • Why do autocrats face structural constraints?
    • What distinguishes authoritarian from totalitarian violence?
    • Group project work time

Fascist Italy vs. Nazi Germany

  • Same era, both right-wing nationalist regimes
  • Both took power through paramilitary violence
  • Both anti-communist, both ruled until death, on the same side of WWII

Mussolini rally

Nazi rally at the Brandenberg Gate

  • Fascist Italy: political repression, exile, killings, but no genocide
  • Nazi Germany: 6 million Jews murdered as a category, plus Roma, disabled people, Slavs

Autocracy and democracy refresher

  • Regime: set of rules and institutions that determine how power is acquired, used, transferred
    • Democracy: political power constrained by competitive elections, civil liberties, rule of law
    • Autocracy: political power concentrated and not accountable through free elections
  • Types of autocracies:
    • Monarchical
    • Military
    • Civilian (a residual category)

King Mswati III of Eswatini in traditional ceremonial dress

Mswati III (Eswatini)
Chosen king by his father’s wives at age 14

Min Aung Hlaing, commander of the Myanmar military, in full military uniform adorned with medals

Min Aung Hlaing (Myanmar)
Invaded capital city; arrested civilian leaders

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, in a suit and tie

Xi Jinping (China)
Appointed leader of Communist Party after 30+ year political career

Olson: the structural logic of autocratic extraction

  • All regimes have an encompassing interest: they benefit when subjects are productive
    • …But autocracies also face no electoral constraint on extraction
  • So they extract up to the revenue-maximizing rate: the grasping hand
  • Democratic majorities, because they also earn market income, extract less

A golden goose

  • Think of the golden goose story:
    • Autocracies work the goose as hard as possible without killing it
    • In democracies, the goose gets to vote!
  • This tells us “autocracies harm their populations more on average”
  • But it cannot distinguish Hitler from Mussolini

The dictator’s dilemma

  • Dictatorships make a lot of people unhappy
  • Excluding the wrong people from power can be risky
  • Mechanisms of contestation and participation mitigate these problems in a democracy
  • But dictators also face structural problems that constrain them
    • Problem of authoritarian control (threats from the masses)
    • Problem of authoritarian power sharing (threats from elites)

Protesters in Tunisia during the Arab Spring, 2011

Ben Ali (Tunisia)
The Arab Spring brought down the seemingly stable regime regime

Tanks and Miliția on the Magheru Boulevard in Bucharest during the 1989 Revolution

Nicolae Ceaușescu (Romania)
Executed after a government rally swelled into a popular uprising

South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee

Park Chung Hee (South Korea)
Assassinated at dinner by his own intelligence chief

Graph showing most dictator exits are due to coups, then popular uprisings, then democratic transitions, then assassination, then foreign intervention

Source: Svolik (2012)

The dilemma and state crimes

  • Information problem: no free speech means no reliable signal of where the regime is weak
    • Dictatorships encourage preference falsification: are you really loyal or just afraid?
    • Excessive monitoring and repression to help gain knowledge
    • Cults of personality force costly signals: you compromise yourself with public praise
  • Recruitment and distribution problems: building and sharing power with your coalition
    • Can’t trust loyal deputies, so purge them before they defect

Idealized portrait of Kim Jong Il

State media claims former dictator Kim Jong Il:

  • Caused a new star to appear in the sky on his birthday
  • Learned to walk at three weeks old
  • Made 11 holes-in-one the first time he ever played golf
  • Wrote 1,500 books and six operas while in college

Authoritarian power in action

Authoritarian vs. totalitarian regimes

  • Our typology from L3 classifies autocracies by who rules (monarchical, military, civilian)
  • Linz classifies regimes by how they rule
What it does Authoritarian Totalitarian
Pluralism Removes the brakes Limited, but tolerated Monistic — institutions survive only if regime allows
Belief system Designates the victims A mentality, not an ideology Elaborate, exclusive ideology
Mobilization Recruits the perpetrators Low or suppressed Active participation demanded
Prototype Mussolini’s Italy Hitler’s Germany
  • Monistic = one center of power: churches, courts, businesses survive only if regime allows
    • Not the same as monolithic: factions exist, but only within the ruling elite

Terror

  • Linz’s caveat: terror alone does not define totalitarianism
    • Some authoritarian regimes are brutally violent (Trujillo’s Dominican Republic)
    • Some totalitarian regimes have stabilized with reduced arbitrary terror (post-Stalin USSR)
  • But terror is far more probable under totalitarianism and takes a qualitatively different form

Coercion in totalitarian systems has distinctive features:

  • Scale: Stalin ~20m dead, Holocaust ~6m, Mao consolidation ~1–3m
  • Categorical targeting: group membership, not individual guilt (however tenuous)
  • Lawlessness: punishment without trial; law subordinated to ideology, not procedure
  • Moral self-righteousness: agents believe they are doing good
  • Extension to the elite: Stalinist purges of marshals, Old Bolsheviks
  • Intent over action: punishment for who you are, not what you did

Moral self-righteousness in action

“Stalin was convinced that it was necessary for the defence of the interests of the working class against the plotting of the enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the working class, the interests of the working people, the interests of the victory of Socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interests of the Party, of the working masses, in the name of defence of the revolution’s gains. In this lies the whole tragedy.”

— Khrushchev, On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences, 1956

  • Stalin is dead at this point
  • Khrushchev is denouncing Stalin’s crimes
  • Yet actions are still framed as distorted service to revolutionary goals
  • Even condemnation is justified with ideological language
  • Coercion is morally self-rationalized rather than purely criminalized

Joseph Stalin

Nikita Khrushchev

Before we break into groups…

  • Totalitarianism is not the norm: most autocracies are authoritarian, not totalitarian
  • All autocratic regimes face constraints: power-sharing (elite) and control (masses)
  • Pure totalitarianism in Linz’s sense may be largely historical
    • Stalinist USSR, Nazi Germany, Maoist China
  • Many contemporary regimes are hybrids of autocracy and democracy, it’s a spectrum
  • But even “full” democracies are not innocent either
  • Wednesday: does democracy actually constrain state violence?

Read before Wednesday:

Davenport, Christian. 1999. “Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(1): 92–116.

(Available on Perusall via Canvas)

Proposal: You all did great, but common feedback

  • Theory: connect arguments, not just definitions
    • Several groups used readings to classify a situation rather than explain it
    • E.g., Valentino’s contribution is his strategic logic of mass killing, not just definition
    • E.g., Tilly: war and state-making are mutually constitutive not just “states use violence”
  • Audience: pick one or two and build around it
    • The prompt asks you to speak to governments, NGOs, IOs, or other actors, not all of them
    • Identify who has realistic leverage over your case and build your recommendations around what that actor can actually do
    • For cases involving powerful states (US, China): think carefully about how the state might respond to pressure: that shapes which audience and which tools make sense
  • Policy: specificity, not aspiration
    • Good recommendations address what your audience can concretely do, what obstacles they face, and what stakeholders need to be convinced
    • Think about what has already been tried and why it hasn’t worked, your proposals should respond to that

Final project work time

  • Some ideas for guiding questions:
    • Is the regime in your case democratic or authoritarian? Somewhere in between?
      • Go back to L3 if needed
    • If democratic, does that make the state violence harder to explain?
    • Does the dictator’s dilemma help explain who is targeted: elites, masses, or both?
    • Which of Linz’s three dimensions (pluralism, ideology, mobilization) best explains the state violence in your case?
    • Based on the audience for your brief, does regime type shape what you say?
    • What does your case suggest about the relationship between regime type and state crime?
  • Steven will walk around to help
  • If there are group members that are always absent to these sessions during class, note that
    • Part of your grade will be based on peer-reviewed effort