The Internal Organization of Criminal Groups

Organized Crime | Week 3, Lecture 5

Professor Julian E. Gerez

April 13, 2026

Roadmap: The internal organization of criminal groups

  • Last time: origins of criminal groups
    • The origins of criminal groups: individual, social, and structural explanations
    • Any questions from last week?
  • Today and Wednesday: how are criminal groups organized?
  • Also: quiz on Wednesday (more information at the end of lecture)

Structure

Criminal groups are networks

  • OC: attempt to regulate/control the production/distribution of a given commodity unlawfully
    • This tells us what criminal groups do, not how they are structured
  • Structure does not define criminal groups, but all criminal groups have some kind of structure
  • All criminal groups are networks of individuals connected by relationships

Nodes: individual actors or groups

A B C D E F G H

Ties: relationships between nodes

A B C D E F G H

How many members/nodes?

What are the pros and cons of each?

Small organizations

  • Easier to keep secret
  • Higher trust between members
  • Faster, more flexible decisions
  • \(\rightarrow\) But limited capacity and reach

Large organizations

  • Greater market power and resources
  • More career paths and specialization
  • Better able to absorb losses
  • \(\rightarrow\) But harder to coordinate and conceal

Illegality creates pressure to stay small but criminal ambitions push toward growth

Decentralized versus centralized networks

What are the pros and cons of each?

Decentralized network

A B C D E F G H
  • Less clear authority and chain of command
  • \(\rightarrow\) Harder coordination and discipline
  • Power distributed across nodes
  • \(\rightarrow\) Harder for law enforcement to target

Centralized network

B C D E F G H A
  • Clearer authority and chain of command
  • \(\rightarrow\) Easier coordination and discipline
  • Power concentrated in fewer nodes
  • \(\rightarrow\) More obvious targets for law enforcement

Compartmentalization

What are the pros and cons of each?

Low compartmentalization

A E B C F D G
  • Many connections between nodes
  • \(\rightarrow\) More efficient communication
  • Nodes more aware of each other’s activities
  • \(\rightarrow\) Informants expose more of the network

High compartmentalization

A E B C F D G
  • Fewer connections between clusters
  • \(\rightarrow\) Protection against infiltration/informants
  • Nodes know only what they need to know
  • \(\rightarrow\) Slower coordination and decision-making

Think-pair-share: properties of criminal networks

Dimension Less More Core tradeoff
Size Small Large Secrecy vs. capacity
Centralization Decentralized Centralized Resilience vs. control
Compartmentalization Low High Efficiency vs. security
  • How would a legal firm resolve these tradeoffs differently than a criminal group, and why?
  • Which dimension do you think matters most for a criminal group’s survival?

Organizational problems

The fundamental problems all organizations face

  • In Lecture 3 we learned about how cooperation between people can be hard
    • Collective action problem: individual self-interest produces worse group outcomes
    • Free-rider problem: individuals want to enjoy group benefits without contributing
  • Today we will go into detail on a related issue, the principal-agent problem:
    • When one person delegates a task, the other person may have different interests
    • The person in charge can’t perfectly monitor how the task is carried out
  • Criminal groups face all these problems, too
    • Members are tempted to steal from or inform on the group
    • Members are tempted to free-ride on others’ work
    • Leaders cannot ensure that members follow orders perfectly
  • Legal organizations solve these with contracts, courts, and formal authority
  • Criminal organizations must solve these problems without any of these

How do criminal groups sustain cooperation without law?

Collective action problem review

  • Collective action problem: individuals self-interest produce worse outcomes for the group
    • …Even though cooperation would make everyone better off

Examples:

  • Prisoner’s dilemma/state of nature game from Lecture 3
  • Dorm kitchen: everyone wants a clean kitchen but no one wants to be the one to clean it
  • Overfishing: each boat catches as much as possible, fishery collapses for everyone
  • Nuclear proliferation: each country wants nukes even if a nuclear world is worse for all

The same logic applies inside criminal organizations

  • Levitt & Venkatesh (2000): foot soldiers routinely skimmed drug revenues
    • Individually rational: pocket a little extra for yourself
    • Collectively worse: estimated 15% of revenues lost
    • …and if everyone does it too much, the operation can collapse

Collective action in small vs. large groups

  • In small groups, voluntary cooperation can be feasible
    • Each person receives a significant share of the benefits
    • Each person’s behavior is visible to others: defectors can be identified and sanctioned
    • Example: doing the dishes with one other roommate, your policy brief
    • Example: a small mafia family working together
  • In large groups, voluntary cooperation breaks down
    • One person in a million receives one-millionth of the benefit of a public good
    • But bears the full cost of contributing to it
    • Easier to hide individual defection
    • Harder to punish defectors
    • So the rational individual free-rides (enjoys the good without contributing)
    • If everyone reasons this way, the public good never gets produced

Let’s play a game! (Public goods in action)

  • You start with 5 tokens, and you want to have as many tokens as possible at the end
  • Choose how many tokens to contribute to a public pot (any whole number, 0–5)
  • The pot will be multiplied by 2 and split equally among everyone in the room
  • Your final payoff = your tokens you kept + your share of the multiplied pot

Public goods game results

  • The pot will be multiplied and split equally among all \(N = 90\) players
  • Average contribution = \(X \approx 2.5\)
    • Pot = \((2.5 \times 90 \times 2 = 450) / 90 = 5\) tokens back to everyone
    • Plus whatever tokens you kept, so each individual gets kept tokens + \(5\)
    • Individual payoff = (5 − your contribution) + \(5\)
  • If you contributed 0, you “won” because you ended up with 10 tokens
  • If you contributed 5, you “lost” because you ended up with 5 tokens
  • But if everyone contributed 0: everyone walks away with 5 tokens
  • But if everyone contributed 5: everyone walks away with 10 tokens

For discussion:

  • What actually happened? Would things be different with a bigger multiplier? Less people?
  • How might legal organizations solve the free-rider problem?
  • How might organized crime solve the free-rider problem?

The principal-agent problem

  • Principal: the party who delegates a task (e.g., a gang leader)
  • Agent: the party who carries it out (e.g., a foot soldier)
  • The agent knows things the principal does not: information asymmetry
  • The agent has their own interests, which may differ from the principal’s

A cartoon image of a dentist practicing

You hire a dentist to check your teeth
They know what’s going on with your teeth… you don’t
Do you really need that root canal?

A cartoon image of a politician at a podium

Voters “hire” a politician to represent them
Voters can’t monitor every vote and deal
Is the politician legislating for you… or for their career?

Solving the principal-agent problem

Align interests between principal and agent and/or reduce information asymmetry by:

Screening for high quality agents

  • Dentists must be licensed to practice
  • Elections produce better candidates in theory
  • AirBnB reviews let hosts and guests screen
  • Firms use hiring processes to select workers

Monitoring or bonuses

  • Dentists who commit fraud lose their license
  • Bad politicians can be voted out in theory
  • AirBnB reviews incentivize good behavior
  • Workers can earn performance bonuses

AirBnB logo over a nicely decorated home A photo of a job interview

Think-pair-share: organizational problems

  • Legal organizations deal with organizational problems with various mechanisms
    • Contracts, courts, licensing, and formal monitoring
  • Criminal organizations cannot use these!
  • For discussion:
    • A gang leader can’t sue a foot soldier who skims drug revenues. What can they do instead?
    • How might not being able to use courts change who a criminal organization can recruit?
    • Does the size of the organization change how these problems play out?

Why illegality makes organizational problems harder

  1. Recruitment and vetting:
    • Can’t advertise, credential-check, or verify who you’re bringing in
    • \(\rightarrow\) No way to know if a new member is trustworthy before it’s too late
  2. Internal discipline:
    • Can’t take a defector to court or fire them through formal channels
    • And information asymmetries are strong because of secrecy required
  3. Reputation and branding:
    • Can’t publicly signal quality or build a visible track record while staying hidden
    • \(\rightarrow\) But you still need a reputation to be effective
  4. Secrecy vs. efficiency:
    • Every new member who knows more is also a bigger liability if caught
    • \(\rightarrow\) Growth and concealment pull in opposite directions
  5. Leadership succession:
    • No formal mechanism to transfer power when a leader is arrested or killed

How organized crime solves organizational problems: violence, trust, codes of conduct

Mechanism 1: Violence

  • Violence is the criminal organization’s functional substitute for courts
    • Punishment for defection: members who steal, inform, or shirk face physical sanction
    • Reputation building: a credible reputation for violence deters defection before it occurs
    • Territorial control: violence establishes and protects market share
  • But violence is costly:
    • Attracts law enforcement attention
    • Destroys trust within the organization
    • Triggers retaliation
  • Effective criminal organizations use violence credibly but sparingly
  • Remember Tilly: violence is the founding logic of both the state and OC

Mechanism 2: Trust and social ties

  • Kinship: family members are harder to betray and easier to trust
  • Ethnicity and shared community: overlapping social networks increase the cost of defection
    • This is why OC often recruits heavily from specific communities, neighborhoods, or families
  • Long-term relationships: repeated interaction builds trust over time
    • Costs of defection are high if they end a valuable relationship

Family photo of the Arellano Félix siblings, founders of the Tijuana Cartel, circa late 1980s

Family photo of the Arellano Félix siblings, founders of the Tijuana Cartel, circa late 1980s

Mechanism 3: Codes of conduct and rituals

  • Written or unwritten rules and articles of membership
  • These codes function as informal institutions
    • Shared rules that coordinate behavior without formal enforcement
  • They work when the cost of violating the code exceeds the benefit
    • Costs include social ostracism or violence

Criminal organizations build their own “legal” systems: informal, violent, and often effective

  • Rituals and initiation ceremonies: create psychological commitment; raise the cost of exit

A wedding ceremony in Sicily from The Godfather

Wedding ceremony from The Godfather

For Wednesday: Quiz

  • No readings for Wednesday, but Quiz 1 is on Wednesday!
    • Taken on Canvas, so please bring your laptop
    • 25 minutes, at the end of class
    • Short response, 3–5 paragraphs
    • Spelling or grammar mistakes OK as long as it doesn’t affect the substance of your answer
    • Attempt to answer every part of the question!
    • Engage with key concepts from the course and explain what they are/mean, why it matters
      • A demonstration that you understand the ideas we have been discussing
      • You will not be required to memorize, e.g., a proper noun or a specific date
    • The quizzes are non-cumulative. This quiz will cover Part 1 of the course
    • Try explaining the key concepts from those lectures to a someone outside the class
    • I have office hours Mondays 1-3 p.m., sign up here
      • If you cannot make that time but still want to meet, email me and our TA, Erin

How will the quiz be graded?

Points Grade Description
20 A+ Correct and comprehensive: nothing missing, nothing extraneous
18–19 A Correct and complete, minor issues with substance of answer
16–17 B Some things incorrect or incomplete, missing a detail or partly answering the question
14–15 C Key substantive errors, misused term, wrong concept, etc.
<14 D/F Many things seriously wrong or missing