Organized Crime | Week 2, Lecture 4
April 8, 2026
A Brief History of Humans (Source)
Our core goal is the accurate description of causal relationships (this is hard!)
The scientific method
Three properties of good science
Market clustering
OC concentrates in specific industries: drugs, gambling, prostitution, construction
Social clustering
OC recruits disproportionately from particular communities and spaces
Spatial clustering
OC is denser in places with weak state presence, porous borders, or high inequality
Organized crime does not always create demand, it serves demand the legal market won’t fill
Individual
Criminal behavior is a rational calculation or a product of personality
\(\rightarrow\) helps explain market clustering
Social / Network
Criminal behavior is learned and transmitted through relationships
\(\rightarrow\) helps explains social clustering
Structural
Social structures block legitimate opportunity, making crime attractive
\(\rightarrow\) helps explains spatial clustering
Commit crime if: Expected Gains > Expected Costs,
Expected Costs = Probability of getting caught \(\times\) Severity of punishment
Applied to organized crime:
Imagine you are choosing between two options:
Applying the formula: commit crime if Expected Gains > Expected Costs
\[\text{Expected Gains} = \$40{,}000\]
\[ \text{Expected Costs} = 20\% \times \$50{,}000 = \$10{,}000 \]
\[\text{Net expected value of crime} = \$40{,}000 - \$10{,}000 = \mathbf{\$30{,}000}\]
\[ \$30{,}000 > \$20{,}000 \implies \text{crime is the “rational” choice} \]
Albanese identifies five types of opportunity factors:
Economic conditions: poverty, unemployment, inequality make crime more attractive
Government regulation: creating banned goods or services creates criminal markets
Enforcement effectiveness: weak or corrupt enforcement lowers expected costs of crime
Demand for a product or service: high consumer demand creates revenue to cover risks
New opportunities via social or technological change: internet fraud, new drug markets
Even with strong opportunity factors, OC may require pre-existing social infrastructure
Testing structural/rational choice theory
Dube, García-Ponce & Thom (2016): Maize to Haze
Testing social/network theory
Sviatschi (2022): Making a Narco in Peru
Testing Albanese’s opportunity model
Gerez and Barham: Eradication and Diversification
Challenging spatial clustering
Dipoppa (2025): Mafia expansion in Italy
Read before Monday:
Levitt, Steven D., and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. 2000. “An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 755–789.
(Available on Perusall via Canvas)
Organized Crime | Spring 2026
Social/network explanations: learning theories